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THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST STATUTE
IN MISSOURI.
The real party in interest statute was passed in Missouri
in 1849 as a part of the practice act. Before that date two
other statutes dealing with the question of parties plaintiff
had been passed: a statute abolishing the straw plaintiff in
actions of ejectment, and a statute providing that the assignee
of a bond or note might sue in his own name. These statutes
will be considered first.
I.
THE EJECTMENT STATUTE.

This statute was first passed while Missouri was still a
territory, in 1807. The common law action of ejectment was
originally an action by a lessee of land to recover damages
against one who had wrongfully ejected him from the land; at
first the lessee could recover only damages, but equity, taking
jurisdiction to put the lessee back in possession, the common
law courts, afraid of losing business, themselves ordered the
lessee to be put back in possession by the sheriff. The old
common law real actions for the recovery and the trying of
title to land (such as the writs of right and of dower) were so
cumbrous and dilatory and expensive that courts and lawyers
were anxious to devise a substitute. This they accomplished
by a series of fictions, with the action of ejectment as a basis.
They did it in this way. Suppose A is in possession of land
claimed by B. B would enter upon the land secretly, and
make a lease of it for a term of years to C who would take
possession. When A found C in possesssion he would eject
him; C would thereupon bring an action of ejectment against
A for the ouster. The parties to this action would be "C on
the demise of B against A." In this action C would allege in
his declaration (1) that B has title, (2) that B leased to C,
(3) that C entered into possession, and (4) that A ejected him.
Since the second, third, and fourth allegations were plainly
provable, the only real contest came on the first, as to whether
B had title as against A. If C was able to prove B's title, he
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was put in possession and he then surrendered to B. Since it
was unpleasant to have an actual ouster by A, the fiction of
''the casual ejector" was introduced; instead of being ousted
by A, C would be ousted by the casual ejector, whom we will
call E, a person chosen by B for that purpose. The action of
ejectment would be brought against E instead of against A;
but of course it would not be fair to recover possession against
A unless A had a chance to defend, so it was required that A
be given notice of the suit and an opportunity to defend it.
Finally it was decided that there was no use going through the
farce of a lease to C, an entry by C, and an ouster by E; so A
was compelled by rule of court to consent to admit the lease,
entry and ouster and simply deny C's title. Hence the lease,
entry, ouster, and casual ejector all became fictions; the name
John Doe was generally used for the fictitious lessee and the
name Richard Roe for the fictitious casual ejector.
The Missouri Statute of 1807 reads as follows: "In all
actions of ejectment the plaintiff shall declare in his proper
name and instead of the fictitious suggestion of lease, entry,
and ouster, shall state that he is legally entitled to the premises
and aver the ejectment and trespass of the defendant, etc."
This statute with additions was re-enacted in 1825. In the
revision of 1835 1 the statute seems to be replaced by a simple
provision that "the action shall be prosecuted in the real name
of the parties thereto, and shall be brought against the persons
in possession of the premises claimed." In the revision of
1845 2 this is repeated, as also in all the revisions I since, except
the revision of 1855, from which it was probably omitted by
accident.
II.
THE BOND AND

NOTE STATUTE OF

1825.

The legal title to a chose in action cannot be transferred
by the obligee unless the obligor consents thereto. This is
because a chose in action is not, strictly speaking, property at
1.
2.

Revised Statutes 1834-5, p. 234, § 3.
Revised Statutes 1845, Chap. 55, § 4.
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all, like a farm or a horse or a gold coin, but is merely a power
to get property from the obligor. A chose in action consists
of a relation between the obligee and the obligor; the obligor
owes an obligation to the obligee and he may insist on performing that duty to the obligee and to no one else. The legislature
may of course interfere and create a new duty to the assignee
in place of the old duty to the obligee. Whether any statutes
having that effect have been passed in Missouri will be discussed
later in this article, but certainly none were enacted down to
1825 which could be possibly construed in that way.
Although the obligee could not pass legal title by his own
act so as to make the transferee the owner, there was nothing
in the nature of things to prevent his appointing another his
attorney or agent to collect the chose in action and agreeing
with him-in case either of sale or gift-at the time of appointment that the agent or attorney should keep what he collected;
the legal title to the money or property thus collected would
pass to the attorney at the moment of collection. Wherever
the giving of such power of attorney was held valid and irrevocable there was an assignment which was practically efficacious, even though legal title did not pass and action had to be
brought in the name of the assignor who was still the legal
owner. This power or letter of attorney for the attorney's own
use seems to have been employed as far back as 1309. 4

The

effect of such use is thus stated by Professor Ames:5 "Indeed
so effective was the power of attorney as a transfer, that during
a considerable interval, it was thought unduly to stimulate
litigation, and therefore to fall within the statutory prohibition
of maintenance, unless the power was executed for the benefit
of a creditor of the transferor. Powers executed for the benefit
of a purchaser or donee were treated as void from the beginning
of the 15th century, if not earlier, till near the close of the 17th
3. Revised Statutes 1909, § 2385.
4. Professor James Barr Ames in 3 Harvard Law Review 340, note
2. He quotes from Riley, Memorials of London: "Know ye that I do
assign and attorn in my stead E, my dear partner, to demand and receive
the same rent of forty shillings with the arrears and by distress the same
to levy in my name . . . and all things to do as to the same matter
for her own profit as well as ever I myself could have done in my own
proper person."
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century. The objection of maintenance at length gave way
before the modern commercial spirit, and for the last two
centuries debts have been as freely transferable by power of attorney as any other property."
The effect of the modern commercial spirit demanding that
debts, at least, be assignable, appears first in the equity courts.
At some time in the 17th century equity began giving relief
to the assignee where the assignee had paid value for the
assignment,6 the assignee suing in his own name. The common
law courts, jealous of the growing jurisdiction of equity, overcame their scruples as to maintenance and gave relief to the
assignee even though the assignee -was not a creditor.
It is to be observed that where the assignee by power of
attorney is to keep what he collects, the agency is of a very
peculiar sort; since he is entitled to the proceeds, he owes no
duty to the assignor; he is not a fiduciary as other agents are.
The agency was used merely as a device to accomplish a
particular end. At first it seems that the power to act as agent
or attorney had to be given expressly, but commercial convenience was so greatly helped by the device that later a power
of attorney was implied as a matter of fact from the very act
of assignment. Still later the reason for the assignee suing in
the name of the assignor rather than in his own name was
forgotten, and the courts repeated the apocryphal reason
invented by Coke that the non-assignability of choses in action
was due to the aversion of the.''sages and founders of our law"
to the "multiplying of contentions and suits." I It is to be
observed that Lord Coke's reason explained only one thing,
namely, why the assignee by power of attorney was not allowed
to use it unless he was a creditor of the assignor. It did not
explain why legal title did not pass; nor why under the modern
common law an assignee, may sue in the name of the assignor
though not in his own; for it is impossible to see how the
number of contentions and suits would be made any less by re5. 3 Harvard Law Review 331.
6. In Squib v. Wyn (1713) 1 P. Wins. 378, the court
that
"choses in action are assignable in equity but not at law," asstates
if it were
then well settled.

7. Lampet's Case (1613) 10 Rep. 48a.

REAL PARTY IN INTEREST STATUTE IN

MISSOURI

quiring the assignee to sue in the assignor's name rather than
in his own. It is only within the last half century that Professor Ames,' apparently following a suggestion made by Mr.
Spence in 1847, has shown the true reason as given above.
Besides the fact that the real reason for the assignee suing
in the assignor's name was so long forgotten, there were two
other matters that have tended to confuse the whole subject.
Although equity apparently I only took jurisdiction where
present 10 value was given by the assignor, and later-a little
after 1800-abandoned jurisdiction 1nof simple cases of assignment to the courts of law where the remedy had become
adequafe, the courts and text-books still talk about "equitable
assignment." Where one has a remedy at law and no remedy
in equity it is certainly not accurate to say that his right is
merely equitable; it is a legal right, though he has not the legal
title, and' the term "equitable assignment" should have been
discarded in the interests of clear thinking. The third source
Courts
of confusion is the ambiguity of the word "assign."
frequently say "choses in action were not assignable at common
This is entirely and literally true of the early
law."
common law when an attempted transfer by the obligee to
one other than a creditor had no legal effect whatever, because
held to be within the prohibition at the maintenance statute;
but certainly since about 1700 they have been practically
assignable at common law by using the old device of power of
attorney and allowing the suit in the name of the assignor;
consequently the statement quoted is very misleading. Unfortunately we cannot by a single word discriminate between a
8. 3 Harvard Law Review 339. 2 Spence Equitable Jurisdiction 850:
"But in regard to choses in action, as the same doctrine has been adopted
in every state in Europe it may be doubted whether the reason, which
has been the foundation of the rule everywhere else, was not also the reason
for its introduction in this country; namely, that the credit being a personal
right of the creditor, the debtor being obliged toward that person could
not by a transfer of the credit, which was not an act of his, become obliged
towards another."
9. Carteret v. Paschal (1733) 3 P. Wms. 197, there is a dictum that
a gratuitous assignment is valid in equity.
10. In Catorv. Burkes (1785) 1 Brown's Chancery Cases 434, equity
refused to take jurisdiction of a case of a simple assignment to a creditor
on the ground that the remedy at law was adequate.
11. Hammond v. Messenger (1838) 9 Simon 327.
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complete transfer of the legal title by consent of the obligorthat is, by novation-and a transfer without such assent where
legal title does not pass but where the assignee gets a legal
right to sue. On account of the poverty of our language both
of these are termed "assignments."
Where the assignment is
without the consent of the obligor, the proper caption of the
case is, apart from statute, as follows:
"A (assignor) to the
use of B (assignee) v. X (obligor)." There are several cases
with this sort of caption in the early Missouri reports without
2
any explanation being offered for it.1
Down to 1825, in Missouri, the assignee was compelled
to sue in the name of the assignor in all cases. Where the
assignor had intended to part with all his beneficial interest
and the law gave effect to that intent, he became only a nominal
plaintiff; though not a fictitious or straw plaintiff, as in ejectment cases at common law, yet he was a mere figure head
whose duty was to do nothing and allow the assignee to have
complete control of the action in his name. In 1825 the following statute 13 was passed:

"§ 2. All bonds and promissory notes, for money or
property, shall be assignable, and the assignee may maintain
an action thereon, in his own name, against the obligor or
maker, for the recovery of the money, or property, specified in
such bond or note, or so much thereof as shall appear to have
been due at the time of the assignment, in like manner as the
obligee or payee might have done.
"§ 3. The nature of the defence of the obligor, or maker,
shall not be changed by the assignment, but he may make the
same defence against the bond or note, in the hands of the
assignee, that he might have made against the assignor.
"§ 4. The obligor, or maker, shall be allowed every just
set-off and discount against the assignee, or the assignor, before
judgment, unless it shall be expressed in the bond or note, that
12. The earliest example of this seems to be Cleaveland to the use of
Case and Marks v. Davis (1834) 3 Mo. 234.
13. Revised Statutes 1825, p. 143. No case seems to have arisen
under the statute and it was thought advisable to give above the statute
as it appears in the Revised Statutes 1834-5, p. 105, divided into sections.
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the sum therein specified shall be paid without defalcation or
discount.
"§ 5. It shall not be in the power of the assignor, after
assignment, to release any part of the demand; nor shall any
assignee ever obtain any greater title to, or interest in, any bond
or note, than the person had from whom he acquired it."
These sections were repeated in the Revised Statutes of
1845,14 with two changes to be noted later; also in the Revised
Statutes of 1855 15with an exception given in the footnote. In
Webb v. Morgan 11 the court held that that statute was not
repealed by the practice code of 1849; but none of the sections
except the fifth 17 appears in the revision of 1865 or any succeeding revision, probably because the revisers thought that the
provisions had been superseded and made unnecessary by the
practice code."
The limitations of the foregoing statute are obvious. It
applied only to a certain class of choses in action; wherever it
did not apply the assignee was still compelled to sue in the
name of the assignor."9 While the assignment might be on a
separate piece of paper," ° a general assignment of all the
assignor's "goods and chattels, effects, and property of any kind"
was held not to be such an assignment of a bond as would
enable the assignee to sue in his own name; 21 the court also
expressed the opinion that the assignment must be in writing
to come within the statute, though the statute of 1835, which
14. Revised Statutes 1845, Chap. 21, §§ 2 to 5.
15. Revised Statutes of 1855, Chap. 21, §§ 2 to 5. § 4 was changed
to read as follows: "An account for sums of money or for property due
on contract may be assigned in writing, and the assignee shall have the
same right of action in his own name which the assignor would have had
subject to the same defenses and set-offs, which the debtor would have
had against the assignor prior to notice of such assignment."
16. (1851) 14 Mo. 428.
17. Revised Statutes 1909, § 2775. The fourth section appears
in altered form in the set-off statute, Revised Statutes 1909, §.1867.
18. Long v. Herrick (1870) 46 Mo. 605.
19. Thomas v. Cox to use of Beltzhoover (1840) 6 Mo. 506; a cause
of action arising from a breach of covenant was held not to be covered
by the statute and therefore that action was properly brought in the name

of the assignor.
20. Able v. Shields (1841) 7 Mo. 120.
21.

Miller to use of Morrison and Perry v. Paulsell and Newman

(1844) 8 Mo. 355.
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seemed to be then in force, did not expressly so provide. Later
it was held 22 that the statute required an assignment in writing
signed by the assignor, but this was after the revision of 1845,
which amended section 2 to read:

".

.

. assignable by an

endorsement on such bond or promissory note, etc." It was
also held, although the statute said the assignee "may" sue
in his own name, that the provision was mandatory, and suit
could no longer be brought by the assignor in cases covered by
the statute.3
Before the statute was passed the law was well settled
everywhere that the assignee of a non-negotiable 24 chose in
action took subject to any defense which the obligor had against
the assignor before notice of assignment. 21 This, of course, was
a natural holding; the assignee having only a power of attorney
to collect from the obligor, could recover no more than his
principal, the assignor, could have recovered. Sections three
and four, and the latter part of section five of the statute were
thus declaratory of the common law in preserving these defenses. On the other hand, it was well settled at common law
before the statute that from the moment of notice to the
obligor of the assignment the obligor's duty was to pay to the
assignee; and if in violation of that duty he paid to the assignor,
the assignee could either make the obligee pay again or compel
the obligor to account for what he had thus wrongfully received.
It is likely that the legislature thought that they were preserving the substantive law on this point in the first part of
section five: ''It shall not be in the power of the assignor after
22. Ashworth v. Crockett (1848) 11 Mo. 636.
23. Jeffers v. Oliver to use of Bryans (1838) 5 Mo. 433.
24. The statute of 1835 also had provisions placing negotiable
promissory notes on the same footing as bills of exchange. Where a
negotiable instrument payable to order is transferred by endorsement

and delivery, or one payable to bearer is transferred by endorsement and
delivery or by mere delivery, itis well settled law that the title passes,
the obligor giving his consent to the transfer at the time of executing the
instrument, by using the words "or order" or "or bearer." It is also well
settled that in case of such a transfer before maturity of the instrument
to one who pays value in good faith the transferee takes free from equitable
defenses of the obligor, such as fraud, failure of consideration, etc.
25. Wolf for the use of Prim v. Cozzens (1836) 4 Mo. 432, holding
that if the assignor's creditor garnishees the obligor the garnishment
judgment is a bar to an action brought by the assignee.
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assignment, to release any part of the demand." But the
language of the statute was ill chosen for that purpose; either
the word "right" should have been used instead of the word
''power," or the words "notice of" should have been inserted
before the word "assignment."
As the statute stands if the
first part of section five is followed literally, a release given to
the obligor after assignment but before notice of the assignment
is no defense to the obligor who may thus be compelled, though
innocent, to pay twice; this is contrary to the law before the
statute and seems inconsistent with sections three and four and
also with the last part of section five which provides: "Nor
shall any assignee ever obtain any greater title to or interest in
any bond or note than the person had from whom he acquired
it." In the case of Bates v. Martin 26 it was held that the
obligor must pay again. This aroused criticism 27 but instead
of amending section five as suggested above, section four was
amended so as to read:

" . . . subject to the same defenses

and set-offs which the debtor would have had against the
assignor prior to the notice of such assignment." 25 This has had
the effect of nullifying the use of the word "power" in section
five and in thus restoring the common law as it existed prior to
the statute of 1825.29
III.
THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST STATUTE OF

1849.

The third and most important statute regarding parties
plaintiff was part of the practice code of 1849. This provided
as follows: 0 "Every civil action must be prosecuted in the
26. (1834) 3 Mo. 367. See also St. Louis Perpetual Insurance Co.
v. Cohen (1845) 9 Mo. 421, 422.
27. Gates v. Kirby (1850) 13 Mo. 157.
28. This change seems to have been made in the acts of 1849, p.
75; see Bartlett v. Eddy (1892) 49 Mo. App. 32, 53. It appears in the
revision of 1855 at p. 322. In the revision of 1865, p. 602, it appears in
the chapter on set-offs; also in later revisions; see Revised Statutes 1909,
§ 1867: "In actions on assigned accounts and non-negotiable instruments

the defendant shall be allowed every just set-off or other defense which
existed in his favor at the time of being notified of such assignment.'
'29. Powers v. Woolfolk (1908) 132 Mo. App. 354, 361.
30. Laws of 1849, p. 75. The next section provided as follows:
"In case of an assignment of a thing in action, the action by the assignee
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name of the real party in interest except as otherwise provided
in the next section." "An executor or administrator, a trustee
of an express trust, or a person expressly authorized by statute
may sue in his own name without joining with him the person
for whose benefit the suit is prosecuted." In the revision of
1855 this was amended to read as follows: 3 "Every action shall
be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except
as otherwise provided in the next succeeding section; but this
section shall not be deemed to authorize the assignment of a
thing in action not arising out of contract." "An executor or
administrator, a trustee of an express trust, or a person expressly
authorized by statute, may sue in his own name without joining
with him the person for whose benefit the suit is prosecuted. A
trustee of an express trust within the meaning of this section,
shall be construed to include a person with whom or in whose
name a contract is made for the benefit of another." 32
It has been universally admitted that the code provision
just quoted applies to the assignment of choses in action. It
is much broader than the statute of 1825 since it is not limited
to bonds and notes and no particular form of assignment is
required. 3 What effect did this have upon the enforcement of
the assignee's rights?
A.
Are Tort Actions Assignable under the Code?
What is the meaning of the provision in our present code
that "this section shall not be deemed to authorize the assignment of a thing in action not arising out of contract?" Did
shall be without prejudice or other defense existing at the time of and
before notice of the assignment; but this section shall not apply to bills
of exchange, nor to promissory notes for the payment of money express
on the face thereof to be for value received, negotiable and payable without defalcation." This did not appear in the revision of 1855 under the
practice act, but the substance of it appeared in a bond and note statute
on page 322.

In the revision of 1865 and later revisions it appears in the

chapter on set-offs.
See ante, footnote 28.
31. Revised Statutes 1855, Chap. 128, p. 1217.
32. The same sections appear in Revised Statutes 1909, §§ 1729,
1730, with the single change of the word "must" to "shall."
33. See Smith v. Sterritt (1857) 24 Mo. 260; Willard v. Moies (1860)
30 Mo. 142.
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the framers of this code of procedure intend thereby to change
the substantive law as to what choses in action should be
assignable or did they put in this provision merely as a safeguard to prevent any change?
Under the act of 1849, which did not have the provision
just quoted, it was held 4 that an action for the conversion of a
chattel was assignable because it would pass to the executor
or administrator, and that the assignee might sue in his own
name. The first case after the amendment of 1855 came up in
1881,5 the court holding that under the amendment, an action
for the conversion of a chattel was not assignable whether
trover or assumpsit was brought, because it did not arise out of
contract. Four years later the question came up again86 and
the first case was overruled. The net result of this and the
decisions following it has been to restore the law on this point
to what it was before the amendment. The test of assignability now laid down is that which represents the law generally :"7
"All causes of action arising from torts to property, real or
personal-injuries to the estate by which its value is diminished
-do survive and go to the executor as assets in his hands. As
a consequence such things in action, though based on a tort,
are assignable." 89
34. Smith v. Kennett (1853) 18 Mo. 154.
35. Wallen v. The St. Louis etc. Ry. Co. (1881) 74 Mo. 521.
36. Snider v. Wabash etc. Ry. Co. (1885) 86 Mo. 613. This has
become the leading case upon the subject in this state.
37. Missouri has the same rule by statute; Revised Statutes 1909,
§§ 105, 106:
"For all wrongs done to property, rights or interests of another, for
which an action might be maintained against a wrongdoer, such action
may be brought by the person injured or after his death by his executor

or administrator against such wrongdoer.
"The preceding section shall not extend to actions for slander, libel,
assault and battery or false imprisonment, nor to actions on the case for
injuries to the person of the plaintiff, or to the person of the testator or
intestate of any executor or administrator."

39. Following this test these cases held that the tort action was
assignable: Doering v. Kenamore (1885) 86 Mo. 588 (right to bring replevin
for stolen mules); Chouteau v. Boughton (1890) 100 Mo. 406 (trespass to

land); Hamlin v. Carruthers(1855) 19 Mo. App. 567 (conversion); Dickson
v. Merchant's Elevator Co. (1891) 44 Mo. App. 498 (conversion).
In these cases the right of action was held not to be assignable:

Renfro v. Prior (1887) 25 Mo. App. 402 (slander); McLeland v. St. Louis
Transit Co. (1904) 105 Mo. App. 473 (unliquidated claim for personal
injuries), Beachwood v. Railroad (1913) 173 Mo. App. 371 (same; and that
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B.
Are All Actions Arising out of Contract Assignable?
As a matter of substantive law some contracts are still
necessarily unassignable; for example all contracts which
involve a close personal relation such as that of house servant.
And it is doubtful whether the right of action for damages
arising upon breach of such a contract is assignable. ApparentRevised Statutes 1909, § 5438, providing that rights of action for personal
injuries, other than those resulting in death, shall survive to the personal
representatives of the injured party, did not change the rule; but see the
suggestion contra made by Woodson, J., in Redmond v. Railroad, (1909)
225 Mo. 721, 742).
A cause of action for deceit was held in Baker v. Crandall (1833) 78
Mo. 584, to survive to the personal representatives.
But on the question of whether the right of action for fraud may be assigned the Missouri
decisions are conflicting. The following cases held the action assignable:
Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Smith (1893) 117 Mo. 261 (suit in equity
to recover the land of which the assignor had been defrauded); Goodger
v. Finn (1881) 10 Mo. App. 226 (replevin for fraudulent conversion);
Dean v. Chandler (1891) 44 Mo. App. 388 (action for deceit is assignable
if arising out of contract); Steel v. Brazier (1909) 139 Mo. App. 319, 334
(same). In the following cases the action was held to be not assignable;
Hazeltine v. Smith (1899) 154 Mo. 404 (the right in equity to set aside a
deed obtained from the assignor by fraud); Harrison v. Craven (1905)
188 Mo. 590, 601; Jones v. Babcock (1884) 15 Mo. App. 149 (a naked right
to bring an action in equity to set aside a foreclosure under a deed of
trust); Smith v. Harris (1869) 43 Mo. 557, 562.
.
Two tests have been suggested for determining whether the action
for fraud is assignable. In Dean v. Chandler, ante, the test laid down is
whether the fraud arises out of contract. This test, if applied literally,
would leave very few cases where the action for fraud would not be assignable. The other test is laid down in Jones v. Babcock, ante, as follows:
"The assignment of the bare right to a bill in equity for fraud upon the
assignor, is void, as against public policy, and savouring of the character
of maintenance. Of course the case is different where the assignment is
of something in the nature of property. Here the assignee takes not only
the thing assigned, but whatever is necessary to enable him to possess and
enjoy the same."
It seems impossible to reconcile all the cases with either of these tests.
Since the effect of the fraud in all the cases which the writer has been
able to find in Missouri has been to decrease the estate of the party defrauded, there would seem to be no valid reason why they should not all
be assignable. In the rather rare cases where the deceit has caused damage to the person or reputation-as in the English case of George v.
Skivington (1869) L. R. 5 Exch. 1-the action should be unassignable
just as an action for assault and battery or libel is unassignable. The
conflict in the decisions is not confined to Missouri but seems rather
general; it may perhaps be accounted for by a feeling that an action for
fraud, since it involves an attack on the character of the defendant,
should be unassignable, somewhat in analogy to an action for libel which
has to do with an attack on the character of the plaintiff.
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ly no case involving this question has arisen.
In McQueen
v. Choteau's Heirs,4" it was held that a contract to convey to A
a quarter section of land to be selected by him cannot be
assigned from A to B so as to enable B to make the selection;
this was probably on the ground that B's choice might be very
different from A's and therefore to the defendant's detriment.
In Steel v. Brazier 41 there is a dictum that everything arising
out of contract is assignable; the decision, however, is merely
that an action of deceit arising out of contract is assignable.
It is hardly to be supposed that an action for breach of promise
to marry would be assignable, yet it certainly arises out of
contract.

C.
Must the Assignee Sue in his Own Name?
Under the bond and note act of 1835, although the statute
read "the assignee may maintain an action thereon in his own
name," it was held that the assignee must sue in his own name
and could not choose to sue in the old way using the name of
the assignor.42 Since the real party in interest statute says
that the action "must 11 be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest," it would seem clear that the assignee had
no choice, but there is one case 4which squarely held that he
did have an option. The argument in that case was that if
the assignor did not object to the use of his name, the defendant
(obligor) should not. It is believed that this case has never
been expressly overruled, but two later cases 45 are inconsistent
with it, and the common practice at the present time is to bring
the action in the name of the assignee.
40.
41.
42.
43.
tory.44.

(1855) 20 Mo. 223.
(1909) 139 Mo. App. 319, 335.
Jeffers v. Oliver to the use of Bryans (1838) 5 Mo. 433.
The present form, "shall," would seem to be equally mandaLabeaume to use of Chouteau v. Sweeny
(1852) 17 Mo. 153.
45. Brady to use of Brady v. Chandler (1860) 31 Mo. 38; Long v.
Heinrich (1870) 46 Mo. 603, 605.
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D.
The Rights of a Partial Assignee.
It is a fundamental principle of all systems of law that a
cause of action shall not be split up into parts so as to oppress
the obligor with more than one suit unless he consents to such
division. The result of this principle is that if the obligee sues
on a part only of a cause of action and takes judgment thereon,
he cannot sue later to recover the remainder. 46 Perhaps it
might be urged that the obligor should make his objection at
the beginning of the suit and not later, but the rule seems to be
well settled as stated above.
This being true where the obligee still remains the owner
of the chose in action, what is the result where he has attempted
to make an assignment of a part of it? The rule against
harassing a debtor by more than one suit against his consent
would clearly prevent the bringing of two suits, one by the
assignor for his part and the other by the assignee for the part
attempted to be assigned to him. On the other hand the
attempted division ought not to result in the debtor escaping
liability. The rule is settled everywhere, 47 therefore, that an
attempted part assignment has no effect at common law unless
the obligor agrees ;41 and hence the assignor may sue and recover
as if no part assignment had been attempted. On the other
46. Ewart on Estoppel (4th ed.) 182, note. The rule applies even
though the failure to sue for the entire demand was the result of mistake.
Wickersham v. Whedum (1863) 33 Mo. 561.
47. See 4 Cyc., p. 27; Love v. Fairfield (1850) 13 Mo. 300. See the
prior case of Laughlin v. Fairbanks (1834) 8 Mo. 367, 370, where an
assignment of two-thirds of a judgment seems to have been considered
valid at law; the partial assignee lost because no notice of the assignment
had been given to the judgment debtor before payment by him to the
assignor. This case must now be considered as overruled.
48. It is well settled that the debtor may consent to the division
of the cause of action, in which case separate suits may be brought;
Gordon v. Jefferson City (1904) 111 Mo. App. 23. See also Bank v. Noonan
(1885) 88 Mo. 372, 377, where the debtor waived his right to object by
failing to raise the mluestion at the trial.
Only the debtor may object to the part assignment; if he does not

object, the question cannot be raised as between two interpleaders both
of whom are claiming to be the real assignee. Johnson County v. Bryson
(1887) 27 Mo. App. 341.
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hand, is there any reason why an equity court, which may deal
with a three-sided suit, should not protect the partial assignee
and thus carry out the intention of the parties? The obligor is
the only one who could conceivably object to this; he might
properly object if the suit in equity imposed a greater burden
upon him than an action at law. While it may have been true
that the burden was heavier some century and a half ago when
an equity trial was by depositions and not in open court, it is
no longer worthy of consideration, because in practically all
jurisdictions the procedure and trial in equity do not differ
substantially from a trial in a law court.
In most jurisdictions 11 the partial assignee is given this
right to sue the other two parties in equity and the result of
giving this right is that from the moment the obligor has notice
of the part assignment, he is under obligation not to pay the
whole amount to the obligee. While justice requires that the
obligor shall have only one suit to defend, it is no substantial
increase in his burden to require him to separate what he owes
into two or more parts, paying part to the obligee and the rest
to the partial assignee or assignees.
While the above statement represents the rule in the great
majority of jurisdictions, Missouri holds that the partial
assignee has no rights either in law or in equity.5 0 This holding
seems to have been due to a failure to realize the true ground
for not allowing any rights at common law. It is contrary not
only to the spirit of the code, but also to commercial convenience
and should be overruled. 5'
49. The authorities are collected in 4 Cyc. 27 to 35. See also 4
Century Digest 1196 to 1203.
50. The leading case in Missouri is Burnett v. Crandall (1876) 63
Mo. 410. See also Leonard v. Ry. Co. (1896) 68 Mo. App. 48; Bland v.
Robinson (1910) 148 Mo. App. 164, 169.
51. The following cases are to be carefully distinguished from cases
of part assignment: one of two joint payees of a note may assign all his
interest to another payee or to another third party; Smith v. Oldham (1838)
5 Mo. 483; McLeod v. Snider (1892) 110 Mo. 298. When a building contract provided for retaining 15% of the contract price until 90 days
after the completion, this was held to be a separable, and, therefore, an
assignable claim. Adler v. Kansas City etc. Ry. Co. (1887) 92 Mo. 242.
Where two plaintiffs for the purpose of consolidating their two actions
into one, each purchased a half interest in the other's claim, the part
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E.
Does the Assignee get Legal Title?
Apart from statute the title to a chose in action cannot,
because of the nature of the subject-matter, be 'transferred
without the consent of the obligor. This consent may be
given either at the time of or after the obligee's act of transfer,
or it may be given in advance, as it is in negotiable instruments.
The legislature may, and-as will be suggested at the end of
this article-should provide that title shall pass without such
assent by the obligor. Does the real party in interest statute
have such an effect?
In assignment cases arising under the statute it is quite
common to find the courts saying that the assignee has legal
title.5 2 In Brady v. Chandler13 the court said: "The assignee
must sue in his own name and not in the name of the assignor.
• . . After the assignment there was no title in Brady and

Brothers [assignors], legal or equitable. They, then, had no
right to bring this action."
The following arguments may be urged to show that legal
title does not pass to the assignee:
1. The statute itself does not provide expressly for the passing of title. Being a part of the practice act it would hardly be
expected that any change in the substantive law was intended,
and statements in the decisions that no such change was
effected are quite common. On the face of it, the statute seems
to assume that there are certain rights in existence and merely
provides that in enforcing these rights the real party in interest
rather than some one else shall be party plaintiff. If, therefore, legal title does pass, it must be by a very strained construction of the statute or by out and out judicial legislation.
assignment was held valid because it did not increase the number of actions for the defendant to litigate. Beardsley v. Morgner (1877) 4 Mo.
App. 139, 144.
52. For example, see Overall v. Ellis (1862) 32 Mo. 322 ("assignee
"); Young v. Hudson
would have a' good title to the notes. . .
(1889) 99 Mo. 102 ("though title was passed to him only for collection
53.

(1860) 31.]Mo. 28.
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2. There seem to be no cases which have required the decision
that the assignee has legal title, while there are cases which are
rather difficult to reconcile with the passing of title. In Brady
v. Chandler, ante, where the statement was clear and unequivocal
the statement of the court was obiter dictum. All that was
necessary to decide was that the statute was mandatory,
requiring and not merely allowing the assignee to sue in his own
name as the real party in interest. It is not unthinkable that
one may have legal title and yet be prevented by statute from
54
bringing suit thereon.
3. If the assignee gets legal title, it would seem to follow
that, if the chose in action is not yet due and the assignee has
paid value in good faith, he would be protected against equitable defenses of the obligor. 55 This point, however, is covered
by another statue 51 which provides that in cases of assignments
of accounts and non-negotiable instruments the defendant shall
be allowed every set-off and defense which existed at the time
of his being notified of such assignment.
This statute, however, covers only defenses in favor of the
obligor. If there are equitable claims of persons other than
the obligor, it would seem that, if the assignee gets legal title,
he would take free from these equities unless provided otherwise by statute. It is well settled that if land or chattels are
held in trust by T for C, a purchaser from T who both gets title
from T and pays for it before getting notice of C's equitable
rights is protected. Now if T should hold in trust for C a
chose in action against X and transfer that to a bona fide
54. Just as one may be prevented from exercising his legal title
because of the doctrine of estoppel. To take a simple case by way of
illustration: A represents, either by words or conduct, that his horse which
is in the possession of B as bailee, does not belong to him; X relying on
this representation buys the horse from B; the title is still in A, but he
is estopped from asserting it as against X.
55. If a negotiable instrument is transferred according to the tenor
of the instrument, before maturity for value, to a banafide purchaser for
value, the latter takes free from equitable defenses in favor of the obligor;
if the transfer is made after maturity, legal title passes but subject to
defenses; the fact that the holder is negotiating the instrument rather
than collecting it is enough to put a purchaser on notice.
56. Revised Statutes 1909, § 1867. This statute is declaratory of
the common law.

UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI BULLETIN

purchaser for value, it would seem to follow that if the assignee
got legal title he would be protected from C's equitable claim
regardless of whether the chose in action is due or not, and
whether it is negotiable or non-negotiable. On the other hand,
even if legal title did not pass, it would seem that, if the assignee
has a legal right to sue and not a mere equity, he ought to take
free.from C's equitable claim. 7 The cases in Missouri on this
point are in a very unsatisfactory condition. In a fairly early
case " it was correctly held that a bona fide purchaser of a
judgment held by A on a resulting trust from B took free from
B's equity. On the other hand in Turner v. Hoyle 51 there is
a dictum that the bona fide endorsee of a negotiable note after
maturity took subject to all equities including that of a cestui
que trust. This seems especially bad because title passed, the
note being negotiable. Neither the counsel nor court alluded to
the possibility of there being a difference between an equity in
favor of the obligor and one in favor of the cestui que trust.
60
This dictum has unfortunately been followed.
If, instead of an assignment by a trustee, "the true owner
of a negotiable note overdue or of a non-negotiable note clothe
another with the usual evidences of ownership or with full power
of disposition, and third persons are led into dealing with such
apparent owner, they will be protected in their dealing." 61
In Turner v. Hoyle, 62 a trust case, the court attempted to
57. There are also strong practical commercial reasons for this.
The assignee can look up the obligor and ascertain whether he has any
defenses, because he knows or may know who he is; C, on the other hand,
not being a party to the chose in action, the assignee has no means of
knowing about this equity. For this reason it is common to speak of
C's claim as a "latent" equity.
58. Garland v. Harrison (1852) 17 Mo. 282. It seems to be the only
case of the assignment of a non-negotiable chose in action by an express
trustee. The nearest case to it is International Bank v. German Bank
(1879) 71 Mo. 183, 198. Apparently the Garland Case has not been cited
in any later case.
59. (1888) 95 Mo. 337. It was only a dictum because the endorsee
took with notice.
60. In accord see Booher v. Allen (1899) 153 Mo. 613, 633; Payne
v. The Bank (1890) 43 Mo. App. 377, 381. Mayer v. Bank (1900) 86 Mo.
App. 108, 113.
61. Lee v. Turner (1886) 89 Mo. 489. See also Newhoff v. O'Reilly
(1887) 93 Mo. 164.
62. (1888) 95 Mo. 337, 346.
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distinguish that class of cases from the trust cases as follows:
"This is not a case, however, in which this principle, which
operates by way of estoppel, can be invoked; Jamison [the
trustee] was never clothed with full power to dispose of this
overdue negotiable promissory note, or of the deed of trust
given to secure it; his power of disposition was qualified and
limited to the single purpose of disposing of it for reinvestment
for the benefit of the trust." The error here lies in the failure
to distinguish between "power" and ''right." Of course a
trustee has no right to do anything that would amount to a
breach of trust; but it is difficult to see why he does not have
just as much power to make a transfer to a bona fide purchaser
and thus cut off equities as one has who, not being a trustee, is
clothed with indiciaof ownership. In fact the trust case seems,
if anything, a little stronger case for the purchaser than the
estoppel case.
4. If the assignee gets legal title one would naturally
expect, in the absence of a statutory provision, that it would
be within the power of the assignor to give a release to the
obligor; yet it is well settled that if the obligor pays the assignor
in good faith without notice of the assignment, he is protected.
And this is true in spite of the statutory provision 63 discussed
ante, 64 that ''it shall not be in the power of the assignor of a
demand after assignment, to release any part of it, nor shall
any assignee acquire greater title thereto or interest therein
than the person had from whom it was acquired." As previously explained the literal effect of this provision has been nullified
by another statute,65 so that the rule in Missouri is the same as
if there were no statute on the point; namely, that while the
assignor does not have the right to receive payment and give
a release to the obligor, he has the power to do so and if the obligor
has paid in good faith he is protected. If on the other hand,
a negotiable chose in action is transferred even after maturity,
so that the transferee takes subject to equities in favor of the
63.
64.
65.

Revised Statutes 1909, § 2775. This was first passed in 1835.
See ante, pp. 9 et seg.
Revised Statutes 1909, § 1867. See footnote 28, ante.
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obligor, the obligor must at his peril pay to the holder of the
note as the one who has legal title.66
5. If the assignee gets legal title it would seem to follow
that if the assignor subsequently attempted to assign the same
chose in action to another person, the second assignee would
get nothing. Yet it seems to be well settled that if the second
assignee, being a purchaser for value without notice of the first
assignment, should collect payment from the obligor; 11 or reduce the claim to judgment in his own name; 68 or effect a
novation with the obligor, whereby the obligation in favor of
the assignor is superseded by a new one running to himself;6"
or if he obtains the document containing the obligation where
the latter is in the form of a specialty 7 0-in all these cases the
second assignee is protected. Further than that, in many
jurisdictions, including Missouri, if the second assignee, being
a bona fide purchaser of the first assignment, gives notice to
the obligor before the latter receives notice of the first assignment, the second assignee is protected.7 ' It is not impossible,
of course, for one party to have legal title and another to have
the power, though not the right, to destroy that legal title; but
such instances are comparatively rare.72
66. There seem to be no cases in Missouri on this point. See
Daniel on Negotiable Instruments (6th ed.) § 1233a, citing Davis v.
Miller (1857) 14 Grat. 1.
67. Bridge v. Conn. Co. (1890) 152 Mass. 343.
68. Judson v. Corcoran (1855) 17How. 612.
69. New York Co. v. Schuyler (1865) 34 N. Y. 30, 80.
70. Fisher v. Knox (1850) 13 Penn. 622 (judgment bond case).
See Ames' Cases on Trusts (2d ed.) 328.
71. The leading case on this point is Dearle v. Hall (1828) 3 Russel
48. See Murdock v. Finney (1855) 21 Mo. 138; Houser v. Richardson
(1901) 90 Mo. App. 134, 139. The doctrine has been much criticised,
because it is difficult to find any sound common law basis for a duty on
the first assignee towards a possible later assignee to give notice to the
obligor. In Missouri the doctrine does not apply where the contract is
between an assignee and one claiming under garnishment proceedings.
The garnishee cannot take advantage of the rule. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Wright (1889) 38 Mo. 141.
72. In England one who has title to a chattel may lose it by a sale
in market overt. In this country by registry statutes a transferee of legal
title to land or chattels may, by failure to comply with the statute, be
postponed to a subsequent bona fide purchaser who does so comply. A
bona fide purchaser of negotiable paper payable to bearer or endorsed in
blank is protected, though the transferrer has no title.
73. The obligor cannot object that the assignment was merely by
way of gift. See Barnes v. McMullins (1883) 78 Mo. 260, 267, semble.
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If the assignee gets legal title, then an assignment by way of
gift inter vivos would be irrevocable from the moment of assignment."a There seem to be no cases in Missouri squarely in
point. In Vogel v. Gast74 it was held that where a chattel is in
the adverse possession of another a mere verbal gift thereofthere being of course no delivery-was ineffectual to pass title
to the chattel. The question of whether the legal title to get
back the chattel might not thus pass by gift was not raised.
On the other hand, even if the gift is held to be irrevocable
from the moment of assignment, it would not necessarily show
that legal title did pass. The donee gets a legal right to sue,
the failure to get legal title is not due to any act omitted by
the assignor but to the nature of the subject-matter, and there
is no good reason why the intention of the parties should not
be given legal effect.
In the face of the above arguments it is difficult, if not
impossible, to affirm that the legal title passes at the time of
assignment. But it may be urged, that, though legal title does
not pass then, it does pass upon notice being given to the
obligor. It is certain that the substantive law fixes the extent
of his rights at that moment, and in trying to express this
courts not infrequently say that the title of the assignee is
complete only when he gives notice. The difficulty with such
a position is that whatever right the statute gives to the assignee-and it purports to make only a change in procedure
by requiring him to sue in his own name-is given at the moment
of assignment; of course such a right may be cut off either by
the obligor paying the assignor in good faith before notice of
the assignment, or by a later bona fide purchaser giving prior
notice to the obligor; but this is by virtue of the law apart from
statute, and not because of any provision of the statute. If
legal title passes upon notice given to the obligor, what sort of
right did he have before such notice was given? If he gets legal
title at all it must be by force of the statute; the statute says
nothing about giving notice and notice is not necessary before
bringing suit.
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F.
May An Assignee for Collection Sue in His Own Name?
So far it has been assumed that the assignment was by
way of sale or gift. Suppose, however, that the assignment is
for the convenience of the assignor in making collection, is the
assignee in such a case the real party in interest?
The answer to this question is that this case is covered by
the exception in the second section of the statute in regard to
express trusts. An assignee for collection is primarily an agent
-that is, one whose duty is to act for his principal. But the
law of agency determines nothing in regard to his relation to
his principal's property. The principal may give him mere
possession-if it is a chattel, he becomes bailee, and, if land,
probably a tenant at will or at sufferance; if, however, he receives title or the legal right of an assignee for the benefit of
his principal he becomes trustee thereof. Being a trustee, it
would seem to'be clear that he may sue in his own name and
collect. On this point the Missouri cases are all happily in
accord with principle.75 The contention contra has even been
made in cases where the transferee for collection has received
title of a negotiable instrument by endorsement; these cases
have been decided similarly that the transferee may sue."6 In
some other states having similar statutes, there have been cases
holding that the assignee for collection could not sue, because
he was not beneficially interested and therefore not the real
7
party in interest."
G.
May a Cestui Que Trust Sue?
Suppose T holds in trust for C some land and chattels and
choses in action; there is a provision of the statute that a trustee
74. (1885) 20 Mo. App. 104, 107.
75. Webb v. Morgan (1851) 14 Mo. 428; Overall v. Ellis (1862)
32 Mo. 322 (negotiable note payable to order, transferred by delivery);
City of St. Louis to use of Becker v. Rudolph (1865) 36 Mo. 465; City of
Kansas to use of Enright v. Rice (1880) 89 Mo. 685; Guernsey v. Moore
(1895) 131 Mo. 650, 668.
76. Beattie v. Lett (1859) 28 Mo. 596; Simmons v. Ball (1865) 35
Mo. 461; Young v. Hudson (1889) 99 Mo. 102.
77. 64 L. R. A. 585, note.
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of an express trust 78 may sue in his own name. Is the word
''may" to be interpreted as "shall'' 7 9 or is it to be given its
If the latter, then it would seem that either
literal meaning?
the trustee or the cestui may sue for injuries to the land and
chattels, or to collect the chose in action-the cestui que trust
being the party benefited thereby.
The first case in which the question arose squarely was
Richardson v. Means."° In that case the plaintiff's father had
conveyed a female slave to one Jozner "upon trust that the
said Jozner, his executor, etc., shall permit my said daughter
to hold possession of and take the use, hire, and profit of the
said Maria and her increase to her sole and separate use during
her life, etc.; and at the death of my said daughter, the said
Maria and her increase to be equally divided between her
The plaintiff sued the defendant for the recovery
children."
of the slave and her two children. The court held that on this
state of facts the plaintiff was not the proper party to sue,
saying: "Under the old form of proceeding this suit must have
been brought by the trustee at law, but if, from any cause, the
legal ownership could not have been made effectual for the
protection of the wife's equitable right, the court would at her
suit, upon a proper statement of facts, all the necessary parties
bring before them, and have administered the appropriate
equitable relief. But it is supposed that all this is changed by
78. The term "express trust" is probably used here in order to
exclude constructive-that is non-consensual-obligations to turn over
property, called usually "constructive" trusts. They are called trusts
because the remedy is similar to the remedy which a cestui que trust has
against his trustee for failure to convey trust property upon the termination of the trust. An exact analogy to this equitable obligation to turn
over specific property is the common law obligation in quasi contract
to pay for the value of that which the defendant unjustly detains from the
plaintiff. Hence, if the plaintiff prefers to get a general money judgment
instead of the specific property, his remedy is indebitatus assumpsit
the obligation is called quasi contractual because the remedy is contractual.
79. Such an interpretation is not without precedent in Missouri.
The bond and note statute of 1825 provided merely that the assignee
"may" sue in his own name, but the courts held that this was mandatory.
Jeffers v. Oliver to use of Bryans (1838) 5 Mo. 433.
80. (1856) 22 Mo. 495. In Gibbons v. Gentry (1855) 20 Mo. 468,
477, the court said: "The plaintiffs show a deed of trust by which the
legal title to the property appears not in them at least. Now these trustees
"
if they accepted the trusts, must sue if they are alive.
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the new code which is true to some extent. It must be observed, however, that the code has not changed the rights of
parties, but only provided new remedies for their enforcement."
This case was followed in Myers v. Hale" in which the
cestui que trust of land held under a deed of trust brought trover
for corn which had been raised on the land. The court held
that the plaintiff could not recover because the trustee had not
refused to act and was therefore the only party who could sue.
In McComas v. Covenant Mutual Life Insurance Co., 8 the
plaintiff's husband had taken out a life insurance policy payable to him, his executors, etc., for the use and benefit of the
plaintiff. The husband, and, at his death, his personal representative, became trustee of this chose in action against the
insurance company for the benefit of the plaintiff, and according to the decision in Richardson v. Means, the plaintiff would
not have been allowed to recover if the trustee was willing to
act. The case of Richardson v. Means was not cited either by
counsel or court and the decision was that under the code the
widow was entitled to sue as a real party in interest, a recovery
by her being a bar to another action by the trustee. The court
cited as authority for this a case 83 which will be shown later
in this article not to be a trust case at all.
The McComas Case has been followed in Chouteau v.
Boughton 84 where the action was for injury to land held under
a trust deed. Counsel for the defendant cited Myers v. Hale,
but the court gave it scant consideration and allowed the
cestui que trust to recover. In Barton Bros. v. Martin 85 the
court lays down the rule of the McComas Case that the cestui
que trust was held to be barred by a prior action brought by
86
the trustee in Which the trustee lost. In Canada v. Daniel,
81.
82.
83.
ficiary of
84.
85.

(1885) 17 Mo. App. 204, 210.
(1874) 56 Mo. 573.
Rogers v. Gosnel (1872) 51 Mo. 456. It was a case of a benea contract, not the beneficiary of a trust.
(1890) 100 Mo. 406, 411.
(1894) 60 Mo. App. 351, 357. In the following cases where the

action was brought by the trustee the rule of the Mc Comas Case was laid
down that either the trustee or the beneficiary of the trust could sue:

Snider v. Adams Express Co. (1883) 77 Mo. 533; Graham v. Allison
(1887) 24 Mo. App. 516, 523; Anthony v. Ins. Co. (1891) 48 Mo. App.
65, 70.
86. (Mo. App., 1913) 157 S. W. 1034.
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where the trust consisted of land and chattels and the beneficiary sought to have trust funds restored which had been
wrongfully paid by trustees to the defendant, the court assumed to follow the rule of the McComas Case; but the trustee
had refused to sue, and hence, apart from any statute, the
beneficiary would be entitled to sue, joining the trustee and
the third party as parties defendant.
The reasoning of these two lines of cases is plainly contradictory and the courts have made no attempt to reconcile
them. Nor does it seem possible to draw a distinction upon
the facts which will fit all the cases. Oddly enough, the McComas Case was one of an active trust, it being the duty of
the administrator as trustee of the chose in action against the
insurance company to collect it and hand over the proceeds
to the cestui que trust: while in Richardson v. Means the trust
was a passive one. Nor can any distinction be drawn between
trusts of real and trusts of personal property. In each of the
cases just mentioned the trust was of personalty, whereas in
Myers v. Hale, which followed the Richardson Case, and Chouteau v. Boughton, which followed the McComas Case, the trust
property consisted of land. It is to be observed that the
statute does not justify any such distinction between trusts
as here suggested; so far as the statute is concerned it must
be interpreted as allowing all trust beneficiaries to sue or none.
There being no way to reconcile the decisions, which line
of cases is to be preferred? When it is considered that it is
very easy in this state to get rid of a trustee who refuses to
do his duty and get a new one appointed in his place,"7 and
that it is the settled law of trusts apart from statute that if
the trustee refuses to bring an action against a third party the
beneficiary may sue the trustee for breach of trust and join
the third party so as to complete the litigation in the one suit,
there seems to be no need for the doctrine of the McComas
Case. If the doctrine is retained it should be carefully limited
to simple cases where the cestui or cestuis are of full age and sui
juris, and, therefore, able to put an end to the trust at any
87.

Revised Statutes 1909, §§ 11919, 11920.
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time. In the McComas Case this was the situation, while in the
Richardson Case two of the three beneficiaries were probably
minors. It should be added that the courts paid no attention
to these facts in making their decision in the two cases, and
that the statute does not justify any such middle ground.
H.
May an Heir Sue?
The statute provides that an administrator or an executor
may sue without joining with him the beneficiary of the suit.
Does this mean that he must sue or that the heir may also sue?
This question, so far as the statute is concerned, is similar to
the question of whether a cestui que trust may sue, and so far
as a reasonable construction of the statute is concerned, no
middle ground is possible: either an heir cannot sue at all or
he may always sue, either for injuries to the chattels of the
decedent or for the collection of choses in action due to the
estate.
The general rule is laid down in all the cases that the heir
cannot sue." If there is an administrator or an executor acting, there seems to be no exception to this; but in Byers v.
Weeks 81 the court, while affirming this general proposition that
the administrator must sue and not the heir, held that where
the administrator had been discharged and afterward additional
assets had been discovered, the heirs at law were entitled to a
remedy in equity to collect these assets, there being no adequate
remedy at law. In McCrackin v. McCaslin,0 it was held that
where the decedent left no debts and the heirs were of full age
an administrator need not be appointed if the heirs could agree
to a distribution of the property. This has been followed in
88. Brueggeman v. Jurgensen (1856) 24 Mo. 86, 89: "If the heirs
were permitted to join in such an action a confusion would result which
no court could disentangle." Smith v. Denny (1865) 37 Mo. 20; Hillman
v. Wellenkamp (1880) 71 Mo. 407; Griswold v. Mattix (1886) 21 Mo. App.
282, 285; Beecraft v. Lewis (1890) 41 Mo. App. 546, 554; Green v. Tillman
(1894) 124 Mo. 372, 377; Perkins v. Goddin (1905) 111 Mo. App. 429, 438.
89. (1903) 105 Mo. App. 72.
90. (1892) 50 Mo. App. 85.
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Richardson v. Cole.9 In Griesel v. Jones,92 the question arose
squarely, whether in such case the heirs might sue a debtor
to the estate. It was held that they might as an exception to
the general rule. The court said: "What is the condition under
which an exception to this general rule should be permitted?
Obviously it should embrace these three elemental facts: First,
the absence of debts against the estate; Second, the legal age
of each of the heirs entitled to share in its distribution; and
Third, a unanimity among them as expressed by their agreement or acts to dispense with an administrator." The wisdom
of the exception seems obvious; it is interesting to note that no
attempt has been made to base it upon the real party in interest
statute, but upon cases from other states.3
I.

"A Person with Whom or in Whose Name a Contract is Made for
the Benefit of Another."
The statute provides that "a trustee of an express trust,
within the meaning of this section, shall be construed to include
a person with whom or in whose name a contract is made for
the benefit of another." What does this mean?
If a person makes a contract, apparently acting for himself, but in reality acting as agent for another, either the agent
or the undisclosed principal may sue thereon. The agent in
such a case is really the trustee of the chose in action for his
principal-not strictly an express trustee because no words
showing an intent to be a trustee may be shown; but the fact
that he is acting for his principal shows that he intends to use
the contract not for his own benefit, but for the benefit of his
principal. Thus the only difference between this trust and the
ordinary express trust is the evidence by which it is proved.
Hence the statute may well provide that the term express trust
shall include such a case as this.
91. (1900) 160 Mo. 372, 377.
92. (1906) 123 Mo. App. 45, 55. See also McDowell v. Orphan
School (1900) 87 Mo. App. 386, where the ancestor had been dead 35
years and the heirs sued to recover a legacy due to the ancestor.
93. The court in McCracken v. McCaslin cited cases from Alabama,
Georgia, Michigan, Mississippi, and New Hampshire.
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It was not always recognized that the agent in such a case
was a trustee for his principal; this part of the law grew up as
a part of the law of agency rather than of trusts, and hence we
have, apart from statute, the anomaly that either the agent or
the undisclosed principal may sue. The real party in interest
statute seems to have made no change in this rule. 94 Cases where
the agency and the identity of the principal are known, but the
contract is nevertheless taken in the name of the agent, seem
always to have been recognized as trust cases, and apart from
statute, only the agent can sue.95 It seems, therefore, a fair
inference that the cases meant by the words ''a person with
whom a contract is made for the benefit of another" were these
agency cases.
It is fairly clear also, that "a person in whose name a contract is made for the benefit of another" was meant to include
another distinct class of cases. If A buys land from X but takes
title in the name of B, it may be shown that B was not to take
beneficially, but upon trust,96 and unless B was a dependent
of A's there is a presumption to that effect. This is usually
called a resulting trust. So if A merely made a contract with
X but had the contract made in the name of B instead of his
own, there would be similarly a resulting trust of the contract.97
This would be, literally, a contract made in the name of one
person for the benefit of another; and since the resulting trust
here is based on the intent of the parties, it is not wholly inappropriate to use the term "express trust" to include it.

J.
The Beneficiary of a Contract.
It seems clear enough that the agency and resulting trust
cases just discussed are covered by the statutory definition of
94. Snider v. Adams Express Co. (1883) 77 Mo. 523, holding that
an agent of an undisclosed principal may sue. See also Draper v. Farris
(1893) 56 Mo. App. 417.
95. Harriganv. Welch (1892) 49 Mo. App. 496, 504. On the other
hand, unless the contract is clearly made with the agent, only the dis-

closed principal may sue. White v. Bennet (1821) 1 Mo. 102.
96. Hall v. Hall (1891) 107 Mo. 101.
97. There seems to be no case in Missouri squarely in point but a
very similar case is that of Garlandv. Harrison (1852) 17 Mo. 282, where
A bought a judgment and took an assignment of the judgment in the
name of B.
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an express trust, and that they give a satisfactory answer to the
question of what -the definition means. There is, however,
another class of cases which has been sometimes thought to
be referred to.
If A makes a contract with B whereby A agrees to pay
money to X, X, not being a party to the contract, was formerly
not allowed to sue, and that is still the law in England and in
some of the jurisdictions in this country."8 There are two classes
of cases depending upon whether the money to be paid to X is
or is not in satisfaction of a claim which X has against B; if it
is, then we may call X a payment beneficiary, because a performance of the contract will result in a payment of the claim
which X has against B; if it is not, then X may be properly
called a gift beneficiary because the performance of the contract will result in a gift from B to X. Within the past century
about two-thirds of the American jurisdictions have changed
the common law in this respect and allow the payment beneficiary to sue. The leading though not the earliest case on the
subject was the New York case of Lawrence v. Fox. 9 In something like half the jurisdictions the gift beneficiary is also allowed to recover.
It is to be observed that the payment beneficiary was in
need of a remedy against the promisor only in case B, the
promisee-his debtor-became insolvent; and if B did become
insolvent and legal execution became impossible, the payment
beneficiary would be entitled-apart from the doctrine of
Lawrence v. Fox,-to reach this asset by a creditor's bill for
equitable execution. On the other hand, if the gift beneficiary
is denied a remedy against the promisor, he has no remedy
whatever; and furthermore, the promisee in such case could
recover only nominal damages on the contract because nonperformance causes him no loss; he could recover substantial
damages only by suing in quasi contract for the value of what
the promisor had received from him on the face of the promise.
98.
English
Harvard
99.

For a full discussion of the subject with exhaustive citation of
and American Cases see an article by Professor Williston, 15
Law Review 767.
(1859) 20 N. Y. 268.
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From the standpoint of principle it would have been better
to give the equitable remedy of specific performance to the gift
beneficiary; if this had been done the promisee could have
been made a party and all three parties would have been concluded by the decree. The remedy which is actually given to
both gift and payment beneficiaries is an action of special assumpsit based upon the promise. 0
In Missouri the rule seems to be well settled that either
kind of beneficiary can recover. The earliest case on the subject is Robbins v. Ayres; '10 this was a case of payment beneficiary, and it was held that where the contract was not under
seal he could recover. This was followed in Meyer v. Lowell 102
and Flannigan v. Hutchinson. °3 Robbins v. Ayres was decided
before the practice act of 1849; neither of the other two cases
mentioned that act as having anything to do with their decision. In Rogers v. Gosnel 104 the court, after deciding upon
the authority of some New York cases that a payment beneficiary might recover even though the contract was under seal,
added: "I see no good reason for keeping up this sort of a distinction of contracts under seal and not under seal. If the covenant is made for the benefit of a third person, why is he not a
party to it so as to maintain an action in his own name? The
party in whose name the contract is made for the benefit of
another, is declared by our practice act to be a trustee of an
express trust and such trustee may sue in his own name. It
does not follow that because a trustee is allowed to sue in his
own name on such a contract, that the beneficiary is precluded
from doing so. A recovery by either would be a bar to another
action, whether brought by the trustee or beneficiary. In
some classes of cases the trustee alone can sue, but this is not
one of that character."
100. Or its code equivalent.
101. (1847) 10 Mo. 538. The question was discussed but not decided in Bank v. Benoist (1847) 10 Mo. 520.
102. (1869) 44 Mo. 328, 331.
103. (1871) 47 Mo. 237.
104. (1873) 51 Mo. 466, 469. The unfortunate dictum in this case
became the basis for the decision in McComas v. The Ins. Co. (1874) 56
Mo. 573 that a cestui que trust may sue.
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It must be admitted that the words of the statute defining
an express trust may be construed to include the cases of the
beneficiary of a contract; but was it so intended by the framers
of the statute and is it a sensible interpretation? The following arguments would seem to compel a negative answer.
1. Such an interpretation must assume that the beneficiary
of the contract is the real party in interest. Whatever may be
said about the gift beneficiary this is certainly not true of the
payment beneficiary; the promisee and the payment beneficiary
are about equally interested in the performance of the contract, and neither can be called exclusively the real party in
interest. Even in the case of the gift beneficiary, it can hardly
be said that the promisee has no interest in the performance
of the contract, where, in case of breach and failure of the gift
beneficiary to sue, he is entitled to nominal damages in an action
for breach of the contract, or to the value of the amount received by the defendant in an action based on quasi contract.
2. There is, on the part of the promisee, no intent, either
express or to be implied from circumstances, to become a
trustee. He undertakes no positive duty whatever. The money
is to be paid to the beneficiary, not to him. Where the beneficiary is allowed an action, the promisee must account for any
payment received by him, but this is because he has violated
his negative duty to keep his hands off.
3. That the framers did not actually intend to cover these
cases is a fair inference from the fact that before the statute
a payment beneficiary was allowed to sue, and that it was apparently not till twenty-four years after the statute was passed
that anyone thought of referring to it as having anything to do
with the case. Lawrence v. Fox, which is the leading case on
the subject in American law, makes no such reference.
4. The statute is avowedly a regulation of procedure
merely. The difficulty in contract beneficiary cases has not been
a question of how his right shall be enforced but really a question
of substantive law-whether he has any right at all. Wherever
he is given the right there seems to be no dispute in American
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jurisdictions that his remedy is special assumpsit on the promise.105
5. Finally, no good whatever is accomplished by construing
the statutory provision to apply to contract beneficiary cases,
and much confusion of thought has resulted therefrom. As
the substantive law on the subject has developed, a promisee
has no right to either rescind or to collect after the beneficiary
assents; and before the beneficiary assents he may either rescind or collect and disregard the beneficiary. In other words he
never sues as trustee; he either has a right to sue as beneficial
owner and as party to the contract, or has no right to sue at
all. Then what possible good is accomplished by calling him
a trustee of any sort?
Perhaps it may be suggested that although the promisee
in these cases is not in any accurate sense an express trustee,
he is a constructive trustee for the beneficiary, and that the
statute-though awkwardly constructed-was meant to include these constructive trusts in its definition of express trust.
If by the term "constructive trust" is meant that the legal
title to the contract is in the promisee while the beneficial is
in the beneficiary after he assents thereto, every one would
probably agree. The futility of applying the statute to these
cases, as pointed out in argument five ante is just as great
whether they are called express or constructive trusts; and is
it not objectionable to use such a term as constructive trust
with such a meaning when the term fiduciary is quite adequate?
It was apparently first used in this sense by Professor Keener
who called the vendor of land under an enforceable contract
a constructive trustee;" 6 it must be conceded if the vendor
of land is thus classified then the assignor of a chose in action
-where legal title does not pass to the assignee-and the promisee in the contract beneficiary cases might almost as well be
105. In England where neither the payment nor gift beneficiary
is allowed a remedy at law, the gift beneficiary in some cases has been
allowed an equitable remedy, not upon the basis of specific performance,
but by treating the promisor as a trustee. Moore v. Darton (1851) 4 De
Gex & Smale 517. It is clear that there is no trust in any accurate sense
of the term, because the promisor's duty is to pay money out of his general assets and not a duty to account for any specific fund.
106. 1 Columbia Law Review 1, 6.
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included. The objections to such a usage may be stated briefly
as follows: 1. The obligation of the vendor, assignor and
promisee is in no sense constructive;" 7 that is, the obligation
is consensual, while a constructive obligation is properly one
which the law imposes upon a party irrespective of, and usually
contra to his intent, as in case of property obtained by fraud
or mistake. 2. In none of these cases can there be said to be
any unjust detention 108 of the property which is the basis of
the real constructive trust. 3. In the assignor and promisee
cases there is no equity jurisdiction.
107. The obligation of the vendor to convey upon the vendee's
paying or securing the purchase price according to the terms of the contract exists at common law as well as in equity; the difference between
common law and equity here consists merely in that equity gives specific
redress while the common law gives only damages. The obligation of
the assignor and promisee to keep their hands off and allow the assignee
and beneficiary to recover is exactly according to their intent.
108. Until the purchase money has been received or secured according to the terms of the contract there is clearly no unjust detention
of the property and therefore no obligation to turn over the property
to the vendee because of any unjust enrichment. If the purchase money
has been received or secured according to the contract the vendor is under
an obligation to turn over the property, but it is not a constructive
obligation in any sense but one which the common law imposes and for
which equity gives specific redress according to the intention of the parties.
In thig latter case the obligation is more closely analogous to that of an
express passive trustee whose duty is merely to convey; but it is not
exactly that because there is no intention to become a trustee. Where the
purchase money has not been paid or secured it is still farther from being an
express passive trust because he has an interest in holding the property
as security which is quite inconsistent with his being a trustee. The
analogy of the common law mortgage is closer here but that is not a perfect one, because while a vendor may without judicial proceedings put
an end to the vendee's right to specific performance in case of the latter's
substantial default, such a right in the mortgagee is not generally recognized.
As to the assignor, there is clearly no obligation to turn over property
to the assignee. The obligation is to do nothing. The assignor has done
all he can do without the consent of the obligor. He is not detaining
unjustly anything which in good conscience belongs to the assignee.
The only reason why he has not transferred the legal title is because it
is impossible-due to the nature of the subject matter-to transfer it
by his own act.
As to the promisee, there is clearly no unjust detention of anything,
because if the beneficiary recovers at all it is on the basis of a promisehe needs no transfer of anything from the promisee. If a payment beneficiary is not allowed to recover on the promise, and the promisee-his
debtor-becomes insolvent, so that legal execution is impossible, the
payment beneficiary may by creditor's bill for equitable execution have
a constructive trust declared of the chose in action for his benefit; this
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K.
Summary.
It is difficult to point out any salutary result of the real
party in interest statute in Missouri except that the assignee
of a chose in action is allowed to sue in his own name in all
actions rather than in that of the assignor, and, therefore,
need never go into equity as he was formerly compelled to do
if the assignor refused to allow him to use his name. On the
other hand, it has been productive of much confusion and
some injustice. While it has had apparently little or no effect
upon the rights of a contract beneficiary, it has--because of the
awkward way in which the statute was drawn-been referred
to in connection with those cases to the detriment of clear
thinking. Following one of these unfortunate cases, the question as to whether the beneficiary of a trust may sue has been
raised and the law on the point is now in a very unsatisfactory
and unsettled condition; fortunately, the similar question as
to whether an heir may sue has been dealt with without paying
any attention to the statute. The substantive rights of the
total assignee of a chose in action seem to have been affected
not at all-at least the rights have not been increased thereby.
The right of a partial assignee to sue has been denied, though
perhaps in strict justice this unfortunate result should not be
charged entirely to the real party in interest statute, but to
the practice act as a whole in abolishing the difference in procedure between law and equity.
L.
Suggestions.
The power of attorney device has played a useful and necessary part in making choses in action practically assignable, and
obligation arises, however, only upon insolvency, and is based upon the
unjust enrichment which would ensue if a debtor could escape having
his intangible assets used to pay his debts because of the clumsiness of
common law execution.

To apply the real party in interest statute to

a case of this sort and say that in such a case the promisee may suefor

the benefit of a beneficiary is absurd; the promisee being insolvent, the

creditor may prevent him from suing and insist on suing for himself....
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has done much to fix the rights of the assignee; now that the
results are accomplished, however, there seems to be no further
use for it; it has become an archaism which should be eliminated by making the assignee owner, and no longer a representative of the assignor. In view of the present confusion-not
only as to the effect of the real party in interest statute, but
in the use of such terms as "title," "equitable title," etc.and the difficulty of finding a case where it would be necessary
to decide whether or not legal title passed, the elimination
can be accomplished satisfactorily only by a legislative act
which will replace both sections of the present real party in
interest statute. In such an act the following points should be
covered:
1. That where by the substantive law a chose in action
is assignable, the assignee shall become the legal owner thereof, either at the moment of assignment or at the moment of
notice received by the obligor."' If the former point of time
is chosen, his right should be made subject to the release of the
obligor by the obligee for value. And if it be considered advisable
to retain the present rule protecting the later bona fide assignee
who first gives notice, this should also be fixed by statute."'
109. The English Judicature Act, 36, 37 Vict. c. 66, Sec. 25, Subsec.
6, passes title to the chose in action from the moment of notice to the
obligor, provided the assignment and the notice are both in writing. The
statute reads as follows:
"Any absolute assignment, by writing under the hand of the assignor
(not purporting to be by way of charge only), of any debt or other legal
chose in action, of which express notice in writing shall have been given
to the debtor, trustee, or other person from whom the assignor would have
been entitled to receive or claim such debt or chose in action, shall be,
and be deemed to have been effectual in law (subject to all equities,
which would have been entitled to priority over the right of the assignee
if this Act had not passed) to pass and transfer the legal right to such
debt or chose in action from the date of such notice, and all legal and other
remedies for the same, and the power to give a good discharge for the same
without the concurrence of the assignor: Provided always, that if the debtor
trustee, or other person liable in respect of such debt or chose in action
shall have had notice that such assignment is disputed by the assignor
or any one claiming under him, or of any other opposing or conflicting
claims to such debt or chose in action, he shall be entitled, if he think
fit, to call upon the several persons making claim thereto to interplead
concerning the same, or he may, if he think fit, pay the same into the
High Court of Justice under and intconformity with the provisions of
the Acts for the relief of trustees."
110. This would have the additional advantage of giving the rule
a satisfactory basis, which it now lacks.
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2. That the assignee, if a purchaser for value in good
faith, should take free from latent equities of third persons."'
3. That a partial assignment be declared valid; that the
partial assignee and his assignor may join as plaintiffs; in
case the assignor refuses to join, that he may be made
a co-defendant. The result of this would be to make the partial
assignee co-owner of the chose in action; and correct the present
rule on this point in Missouri.
In addition, the present uncertainty in regard to the right
of a cestui que trust to sue should be removed by a statute;
the right to sue should either be denied entirely--except as at
present allowed apart from statute-or allowed only in certain
instances; or it might be allowed in any case in the discretion
of the court.
GEORGE L. CLARK.
111. The present set-off statute, previously referred to, provides
that he shall take subject to defences of the obligor before the latter had
notice.

